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1. Introduction 
 Banks play a major role in the financial system due to their intermediation function. 
Consequently, supervisors need to frequently assess banks’ financial health using early 
warning systems (EWS). Such models mainly focus on accounting data which are backward 
looking and the reliability of accounting data is debatable given the very persistent issues of 
information quality and diversity in the application of accounting principles.1 Thus, to 
improve the supervisory process, there has been a growing interest in the use of market data 
(Berger, Davies, and Flannery 2000, Flannery 1998) which are considered as a viable 
complement to accounting information in the conduct of assessing bank financial health. 
However, to be useful, market information must correctly reflect the riskiness of bank 
activities. Market participants should have incentives to monitor banks; they must credibly 
perceive that they will not be compensated if the bank defaults. Thus, the use of market 
information to complement accounting information in the prediction process of banks’ 
financial distress may be questionable for banks that are considered as Too Big To Fail by the 
market.  
 Studies in the US conducted in this area show that market variables add to the 
predictive power of accounting indicators. The findings of Curry, Elmer, and Fissel (2007) 
and Evanoff and Wall (2001) show that market indicators improve the assessment of bank 
financial health. The results of Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) and Distinguin, Rous and 
Tarazi (2006) on European banks also show that market indicators could predict 
deteriorations in banks’ financial condition at relatively long horizons. They also demonstrate 
the additional contribution of market indicators to accounting information in the prediction 
process and that equity market indicators are not affected by a Too Big To Fail effect. 
 In Asia, little has been written on the prediction of bank failures. Most studies focus 
on early-warning models of banking crises (Demirgüc-Kunt and Degatriache 2000) and do 
not consider the prediction of bank’s financial deterioration at the individual level There is 
also a need for considering the possible existence of a Too Big To Fail effect as it may 
highlight limits in the use of market information to predict financial distress of East Asian 
banks.2 
  The objective of this paper is to determine if, in the Asian banking sector, market 
indicators can bring in specific/additional information in the prediction of bank financial 
distress for both small and large banks. The paper looks into the reliability and stability of 
market indicators given the presence of a Too Big To Fail effect. Indeed, market participants 
might react less strongly to financial deteriorations of large banks because of the perception of 
a bail-out in case of default.  
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology adopted for our 
study. Section 3 describes the data and the set of early accounting and market indicators used 
in our estimations. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology 
 The main purpose of this study is to test the possible existence of a Too Big To Fail 
effect in East Asia. More precisely, we question the ability of market indicators to predict 
bank financial distress for large institutions. Indeed, if a bank is considered as Too Big To 
                                                 
1
 Users of financial information are on the alert with respect to the quality of accounting information since 
management (the company) has the incentive to “select” generally accepted accounting principles that could 
favourably present financial performance. Also, the development and adoption of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) aim to eliminate diversity and country differences in the application of accounting principles. 
2
 Distinguin, Tarazi, and Trinidad (2010) consider the contribution of market indicators in the prediction of 
Asian banks distress but they do not take into account the existence of a Too Big To Fail effect. They focus on 
the influence of banks' balance sheet structure on the effectiveness of market indicators.  
Fail by the market, that is if market participants perceive the existence of an implicit 
insurance, they have no incentives to monitor banks and market indicators should bring no 
useful information to predict banks financial distress. Thus, in order to test the existence of a 
Too Big To Fail effect, we first construct a model including the most accurate accounting and 
market indicators to predict banks financial distress. We then study the impact of size on the 
effectiveness of market indicators.  
 To start off, we need to consider an event that could represent a change in the financial 
condition of a bank. Most studies in the US conducted in this area either make use of explicit 
bank failures or supervisory ratings downgrades as in Curry, Elmer and Fissel (2007), Kolari, 
et al. (2002) and Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001). Studies on European banks make use 
of sharp downgrades (Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes 2006) as proxies for actual bank failure or 
downgrade announcements by private agencies3 (Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi 2006) as 
proxies for financial distress. Since actual bank failure is quite limited in Asia, this paper will 
follow on Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi (2006) using downgrade announcements to capture 
deteriorations in a bank’s financial condition. These downgrade announcements are obtained 
from the three major rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s.  
 Accounting Cji and market Mli indicators are computed at the end of a given year to 
estimate the probability of a downgrade occurring in the following year.  
For each bank in the sample, the dependent variable Y is equal to:  
 1, if the bank is downgraded in the following year by at least one rating agency with 
no upgrading taking place during the entire calendar year and no downgrade or 
upgrade during the last quarter of the preceding year;  
 0, if the rating remains unaltered or if the bank experienced an upgrade during the 
following calendar year; and; 
 NA (not available), for all other cases.  
 
 
 As in Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi [2006], the following logit model is employed to 
estimate the probability of a downgrade: 
 
{ }
1 1
Prob 1                                                                              (1)
J L
i j ji l li
j l
Y C Mα β γ
= =
 
= = Φ + + 
 
∑ ∑
  
where Cji and Mli are the jth accounting indicator and the lth market indicator, respectively, 
and ( ).Φ  denotes the cumulated logistic distribution function. Maximum likelihood estimators 
of the coefficients ( )lj γβα ,,  are used and robust Huber-White covariance matrix estimation 
allows for possible misspecification of the error term distribution. 
 
 
 We first select the optimal set of accounting and market indicators4 and we then test 
the stability of the contribution of market indicators in the prediction process by introducing a 
                                                 
3
 Due to confidentiality laws in most countries, it is difficult to gain access to explicit supervisory ratings in 
Europe. 
4
 Following Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi (2006), in the selection of the optimal predictors of bank financial 
distress, only the predictive power of the accounting indicators is considered first. The best indicators are 
selected through a stepwise process where, as a rule of thumb, a 10% level for type 1 error is retained and a Max 
(Min) LR statistic is used as a criterion for adding (ruling out) each potential indicator to (from) the selected set. 
The procedure is then extended to include market indicators in order to determine their marginal contribution to 
dummy variable. This dummy variable DBIG takes the value of 1, if the bank is considered as 
“Too Big to Fail”; 0, otherwise. Two criteria are used to define a bank as “Too Big to Fail”: 
 If the FitchRatings Support rating is 1 or 2, the bank is considered as Too Big to 
Fail. This support rating indicates the likelihood of public or private support on a 
scale from 1 to 4; a grade of 1 (the highest) indicates the presence of an assured 
legal guarantee. FitchRatings Support Ratings are commonly used in the literature 
to identify Too Big To Fail banks operating outside the US (see Gropp, Vesala, and 
Vulpes 2006 and Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi 2006). 
 Banks with asset country ranks 1 or 2 are considered as Too Big To Fail.5 
 If both the FitchRatings Support rating and asset country ranks are not available, 
banks with asset size ranks 1 or 2 within the country sample are considered as Too-
Big to Fail.6 
 
The model specification to capture the effects of size is as follows: 
Prob ( )
1 1 1
1 '                               (2)
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Y GRPB C M DBIG Mα δ β γ γ
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where DBIGi is a dummy variable which captures the effect of size. The banks are categorized 
in two groups A and B. The bank is classified as group A, if it is from Hong Kong, Korea, 
Taiwan or Singapore; then group B, if from Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia or the Philippines. 
The two country groups exhibit different characteristics particularly with respect to the level 
of development of their financial system. We control for country group differences by 
introducing a dummy variable GRPB which is equal to one for banks belonging to group B. 
 A test to assess the hypothesis that size neutralizes the predictive power of each 
market indicator ( 0 : ' 0 1l lH γ γ+ = ∀ ) is conducted. Estimations are also conducted on two 
sub-samples defined on the basis of the value of the dummy variable DBIG.  
 
3. Sample and Indicators 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of 64 banks from Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. These banks are regularly listed in their home 
countries and are rated by at least one of the three rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s.   
 
Table I presents the distribution of banks by country and specialization7. Information is taken 
from Bankscope Fitch IBCA. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the prediction model. Market indicators are added to the optimal subset of accounting indicators obtained in the 
first step. 
5
 FitchRatings Support ratings and asset country rank information are taken from Bankscope Fitch IBCA. 
6
 Out of the 64 banks that are included in our sample the first criterion (FitchRating support rating) can be used 
for 55 banks for which a Fitch Support rating is available. On the basis of this criterion, 16 banks can be 
considered as Too Big to Fail. We can use the second criterion for 60 banks and 11 of them can be considered as 
Too Big To Fail. The third criterion is used for two banks in the sample and only one of them can be considered 
as Too Big To Fail on this basis (this bank is the fifth largest bank in our whole sample on the basis of total 
assets).   
7
 Commercial banks represent 87.5 percent of the sample banks considered in our study. We have checked that 
performing our estimations on a sample restricted only to those commercial banks does not alter our main 
conclusions. 
Table I: Distribution of Banks by Country and Specialization 
Distribution of banks by country: 
COUNTRY  No. of 
Banks 
Group A:   
 Hong Kong 8 
 Korea 6 
 Singapore 2 
 Taiwan 13 
Group B:   
 Malaysia 3 
 Indonesia 11 
 Thailand 12 
 Philippines 9 
Total  64 
Source: Bankscope Fitch IBCA 
Distribution of banks by specialization: 
  
Specialization No. of 
banks 
Bank holding and holding 
company 
2 
Commercial bank 56 
Cooperative bank 1 
Investment bank 5 
Total 64 
Source: Bankscope Fitch IBCA 
 
Accounting data (annual financial statements) for the banks in our sample are obtained from 
Bankscope Fitch IBCA and weekly market data come from Datastream International. Our 
sample is restricted to the post-crisis period 1999-2004 in order to avoid noise related to the 
1997 financial crisis. Table II shows some descriptive statistics on summary accounting 
information. 
 
Table II: Descriptive Statistics on Summary Accounting Information 
  
Mean2 
Standard 
Deviation2 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total Assets (in million USD) 16447.57 23789.04 162.75 176576.30 
Net Loans1/ Total Assets (%) 52.14 17.87 5.57 94.15 
Deposits/ Total Assets (%) 77.37 16.38 0.00 93.51 
Subordinated Debt/ Total Assets (%) 1.69 1.66 0.00 6.79 
Deposits (in million USD) 13142.94 18174.79 0.00 126694.20 
Subordinated Debt (in million USD) 397.86 750.03 0.00 6014.69 
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 12.70 13.72 4.60 24.80 
ROA (%) 0.78 1.88 -12.13 12.79 
1
 Net loans are defined as gross loans less loan loss reserves. 
2
 Each mean is calculated as ∑∑
==
=
N
j
jt
T
t
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 where N is the number of banks and T is the number of 
financial reports. Standard deviations were computed on a similar basis. 
3.2. Financial Deterioration Indicator 
 Table III provides information on the downgrades used in this study. These 
downgrades are announced by the rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. 
Ratings information is obtained from Bankscope Fitch IBCA and FinInfo. Since several 
restrictions are applied on the construction of the binary dependent variable Y, only a limited 
number of “clean” downgrades are subsequently considered in this study. For example, if 
several downgrades occur during the calendar year, we only consider the first one. Of the total 
forty-five (45) combined downgrades from the ratings agencies, only twenty (20) “clean” 
downgrades are used for the estimations.  
 
Table III: Downgrades Information 
(Number of clean downgrades in parenthesis)   
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
45 (20) Total downgrades 18 (6) 9 (7) 1 (1) 3 (1) 14 (5) 
4 (1) Downgrades by Standard and 
Poor’s 
  
3 (0) 
 
1 (1)  
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
21 (13) Downgrades by Fitch 5 (3) 8 (6) 1 (1) 0 (0) 7 (3) 
20 (6) Downgrades by Moody’s 10 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (1) 7 (2) 
 
 
3.3. Accounting Indicators 
 In this study, we consider a set of accounting ratios (see Table IV) commonly used in 
the assessment of bank financial health. We group these ratios into the four categories of the 
CAEL (Capital, Asset quality, Earnings and Liquidity) rating.  
 Previous studies in this area either consider accounting ratios in level (Curry, Elmer 
and Fissel 2007, Gunther, Levonian, and Moore 2001) or in variation (first order difference) 
(Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi 2006). In this study, as we aim to predict changes in the 
financial condition of the bank, it seems more appropriate to consider the changes in the 
values of the ratios. More importantly, our study requires equal consideration of banks 
regardless of their initial financial strength. More precisely, the downgrade of a sound and 
safe bank as compared to a modestly performing bank can only be captured by a change in the 
values of the ratios of this bank. Consequently, Cji is defined as the annual change in the value 
of the accounting ratio Rji. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV: Accounting Ratios Rj 
Category Name Definitions 
Capital 
KP_NL Equity/ Net Loans 
KP_DEPSTF Equity/ Customer and ST Fundings 
KP_LIAB Equity/ Liabilities 
TCR Total Capital Ratio 
Asset 
Quality 
LLP_TA Loan Loss Provision/ Total Assets 
LLP_GL Loan Loss Provision/ Gross Loans 
RWA_TA8 Risk-weighted Assets and Off-balance Sheet Risks 
(inferred from the Cooke ratio)/ Total Assets 
LLR_TA Loan Loss Reserves/ Total Assets 
LLR_GL Loan Loss Reserves/ Gross Loans 
Earnings 
LLP_NETIR Loan Loss Provision/ Net Interest Revenue 
NIR_NINC Net Interest Revenue/ Net Income 
NIR_EA Net Interest Revenue/ Total Earning Assets 
ROAA Return on Assets = Net Income/ Total Assets 
ROAE Return on Equity = Net Income/ Equity 
Liquidity 
INTERBK Interbank Assets/ Interbank Liabilities 
LIQASS_TOTDB Liquid Assets/ Total Deposits and Borrowings 
NL_DEP Net Loans/ Customer and ST Fundings 
NL_TEA Net Loans/ Total Earning Assets 
TRAD_OPINC (Trading Income-Trading Expense)/ Operating Income 
 
 
3.4. Market Indicators 
 The set of market indicators used in this study and their expected relationship with the 
probability of bank failure are presented in Table V. They are derived from weekly equity 
prices. 
The effects of shocks or the presence of abnormal returns can be captured by the variables 
LOGP, RCUM, EXCRCUM, RCUM_NEG, EXCRCUM_NEG and CAR, while we use ∆BETA 
to detect risk changes.   
                                                 
8
 This ratio is obtained by dividing the denominator of the Cooke ratio by total assets. Note that if we were to 
omit off-balance sheet risks the value of this ratio would range from 0 (lowest possible level of asset risk) to 1 
(highest possible level of asset risk). Because the Cooke ratio also accounts for off-balance sheet risks, the value 
of this indicator can be larger than 1, indicating an even higher exposure to risk. 
 
7 
 
Table V: Market Indicators  
Indicators 
 
Definition 
Expected sign of the 
coefficient 
LOGP  Difference between the natural logarithm of weekly market price and its moving average calculated on one year. Negative 
 RCUM 
Cumulative return: ( )13
, 1
1
1 1bt b t k
k
RCUM r
− +
=
= + −
  
  
  
∏ with rb,t+1 = , 1 , ,( /)b t b t b tP P P+ −  where rbt is the weekly 
return of the stock b;  we calculate this cumulative return on the fourth quarter of the accounting period 
(financial year) preceding the event, Pbt is the weekly stock price of bank b. 
Negative 
 RCUMNEG Dummy variable equal to one if the cumulative return is negative in the two last quarters of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event, and zero otherwise. Positive 
EXCRCUM 
Cumulative market excess return: ( ) ( )13 13, , 1 , 1
1 1
1 1 1 1b t b t k m t k
k k
EXCRCUM r r
− + − +
= =
      
      
               
= + − − + −∏ ∏
 
We obtain rm, the weekly market return, which we calculate from the country-specific market index, from 
Datastream International for the fourth quarter of the financial exercise preceding the event. 
Negative 
EXCRCUMNEG Dummy variable equal to one if the cumulative market excess return is negative in the two last quarters of the 
accounting period (financial year) preceding the event, and zero otherwise. Positive 
 CAR 
Cumulative abnormal returns on the fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the 
event: RACbt= 
13
, 1
1
b t k
k
RA
− +
=
∑  with RAbt=Rbt-( ˆˆ mtRα β+ ). We estimate the market model on the third quarter of 
the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event   
Negative 
∆RISK_TOT Change in the standard deviation of weekly returns between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. Positive 
 ∆BETA Change in the market model beta ( ˆˆˆ mtbt RR α β+= ) between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting 
period (financial year) preceding the event 
Positive 
 ∆RISK_SPEC Change in specific risk: standard deviation of the market model residual between the third and fourth quarter 
of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. Positive 
 ∆Z 
Change in the Z-score between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding 
the event with: Z= ( )1 /b rr σ+   where br is the mean return of stock b on the preceding quarter and rσ  the 
standard deviation of the return.  
Negative 
 8 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 We first consider the predictive power of accounting indicators via a stepwise process. 
The process is then extended to include market indicators in order to assess their marginal 
contribution to the prediction process. Finally, to capture a possible Too Big To Fail effect, 
dummy variables are introduced in the model and estimations are run on restricted samples of 
banks.  
 
 4.1. Predictive added value of Market Indicators 
  
Table VI: Financial Deterioration and Early Indicators: Stepwise Results  
Model Specification:  
{ }
1
Stepwise 1: Prob 1                                                         (3)
J
i i j ji
j
Y GRPB Cα δ β
=
 
= = Φ + + 
 
∑  
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Stepwise 2: Prob 1                                        (4)
J L
i i j ji l li
j l
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  Stepwise 1 Stepwise 2 
Constant 
  
  -1.8368*** -1.8782 *** 
  -6.2013  -6.2811   
GRPB 
  
  -0.9708** -0.9662 * 
  -1.928  -1.8453   
Earnings 
  
∆NIR_EA 
  
-0.6261** -0.6242 * 
-2.1678 -1.9548   
Earnings 
  
∆ROAE 
  
-0.0092* -0.0125  
-1.7313 -1.5527   
  
 Market Indicators 
 
EXCRCUM 
  
 -31.9800 ** 
 
-2.0277   
Risk level to reject γl = 0 ∀ l   4.39%**  
McFadden R2   0.079 0.110   
Total Observations   231 213   
Nb of observations with Y=1   20 20   
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed, for the column stepwise 1, 
on a constant and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process and, for the column stepwise 2, on a 
constant, the accounting indicators previously selected and the market indicators selected by a second stepwise 
process. A dummy variable (GRPB), which is equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group B (ie banks from 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines); and 0, otherwise (ie banks from Hong Kong, Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore) is added. This model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next 
calendar year. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% 
level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics.  
Variables definition: ∆NIR_EA = annual change of (Net Interest Revenue/ Total Earning Assets), ∆ROAE = 
annual change of (Net Income/ Equity), EXCRCUM = cumulative market excess return on the fourth quarter of 
the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. 
 
The results of the first stepwise process considering only accounting indicators (table VI, 
column stepwise 1) show that earnings ratios are the optimal accounting predictors of bank 
financial distress. ∆NIR_EA and ∆ROAE are significant at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The sign of the coefficients also conform to the expected inverse relationship of 
profitability with bank financial distress. The results of the second stepwise procedure (table 
VI, column stepwise 2) indicate that the market indicator that significantly adds to the 
predictive power of the accounting indicators is EXCRCUM that is cumulative market excess 
return. This indicator is significant at the 5% level of significance. The sign of the coefficient 
conforms to the expected negative relationship with bank financial distress.  
 Therefore our results support the conjecture that the introduction of market indicators 
in the prediction model can add information not yet contained in accounting data and we can 
test the stability of the contribution of market indicators depending on the size of the bank. 
 
4.2. Too Big To Fail effect 
 As previously mentioned, the possible existence of a size effect might play a crucial 
role in the prediction process. As Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi (2006) point out, the presence 
of this effect might imply that market information is less powerful for the prediction of 
financial distress for specific institutions. For instance, the existence of public safety nets for 
Too Big To Fail banks may bring the market to react less to significant changes in the 
financial condition of these banks9. On the other hand, as the market may believe that large 
banks provide more reliable accounting information than smaller banks, it can look more 
closely into the financials of these large banks.  
 
 The results obtained for the Too Big To Fail tests are presented in Table VII10. The 
results obtained when we introduce the dummy variable DBIG (Table VII, column Whole 
sample) show that the market indicator EXCRCUM is significant at the 5% significance level 
to predict downgrades of small banks. The test at the bottom of the table shows that this 
indicator is not significant for large banks. Therefore, the conjecture of a Too Big To Fail 
effect cannot be rejected.  
 These results are confirmed by running the regressions on two sub-samples of banks 
(large and small). When only large banks are included in the regression (sub-sample 1), the 
market indicator is not significant. When only small banks (sub-sample 2) are considered in 
the estimation, EXCRCUM emerges as significant at the 5% significance level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 A formal insurance deposit system was implemented in 1963 in Philippines, in 1985 in Taiwan, in 1996 in 
Korea, in 1997 in Thailand, in 1998 in Malaysia and Indonesia, and in 2006 in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Coverage limits are often relatively low compared with US or European standards but banks, specifically large 
institutions, have also benefited from an implicit insurance system before and after the introduction of explicit 
systems for systemic risk and safety net considerations. In this study, we are more concerned about the existence 
of implicit insurance for large banks which may deter market discipline for such institutions than by the 
introduction of explicit insurance systems for depositors. Implicit insurance for large banks such as bailouts is 
expected to be effective in both explicit (formal) and implicit deposit insurance systems. 
10
 On the basis of the criteria defined in 2., 22 banks are considered as Too Big To Fail in our sample: ten in 
group A and twelve in group B. 
Table VII: Market Indicators and Bank Size  
Model Specification:  
{ } ( )
1 1 1
Prob 1 '  (5)
J L L
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Y GRPB C M DBIG Mα δ β γ γ
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∑ ∑ , for sub-samples 
 
 Whole sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2 
Constant 
  
-1.900 *** -2.101 *** -1.805 *** 
-6393  -4.031  -4.858  
GRPB 
  
-0.967 * -0.212  -1.389 ** 
-1.828  -0.270  -1.977  
∆NIR_EA 
  
-0.631 ** -0.607  -0.686 * 
-1.973  -0.982  -1.656  
∆ROAE 
  
-0.010 
 
-0.006  -0.019  
-1.348  -1.252  -0.896  
EXCRCUM 
  
-37.640 ** -2.111  -37.197 ** 
-2.291  -0.046  -1.973   
EXCRCUM*DBIG 
  
32.872       
0.659       
McFadden R2 0.114  0.025  0.180   
Total Observations 213  75  138   
Nb. of observations with Y=1 20  7  13   
Risk level to reject γ1 +  γ'1 = 0 91.45%       
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant, the accounting 
indicators and the market indicators selected by the stepwise processes and a dummy variable (GRPB), which is 
equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group B (ie banks from Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines); 
and 0, otherwise (ie banks from Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore). This model explains downgrades 
(whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Size effect is taken into account in the first column 
with the dummy variable DBIG associated with market indicators. DBIG is equal to 1, if: the Fitch Support 
rating is 1 or 2; a bank’s asset country rank is 1 or 2; or a bank’s asset size rank is 1 or 2 within the country 
sample if both FitchSupport rating and asset country ranks are not available. Standard errors are adjusted using 
the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in 
italics. Sub-sample 1 includes Too Big To Fail banks that is banks for which DBIG=1, while sub-sample 2 
includes relatively smaller banks (i.e., banks for which DBIG=0). 
Variables definition: ∆NIR_EA = annual change of (Net Interest Revenue/ Total Earning Assets), ∆ROAE = 
annual change of (Net Income/ Equity), EXCRCUM = cumulative market excess return on the fourth quarter of 
the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. 
 
 In order to check the robustness of these results, we also run the stepwise processes 
separately on the two sub-samples. Indeed, the fact that the market indicator (EXCRCUM) is 
not significant for large banks does not imply that no other market indicator is accurate for 
such banks. In other words, even if EXCRCUM is the best market indicator for the whole 
sample of bank, it might not be the best one for the sub-sample of large banks. Results are 
shown in Table VIII.  
 
Table VIII: Market Indicators and Bank Size: new stepwise11  
Model Specification:  
{ }
1 1
Prob 1                                                          (7)
J L
i i j ji l li
j l
Y GRPB C Mα δ β γ
= =
 
= = Φ + + + 
 
∑ ∑
 
 
 Sub-sample 112 Sub-sample 2 
Constant 
  
-3.019 *** -1.781 *** 
-4.423  -4.874  
GRPB 
  
0.561  -1.515 ** 
0.562  -2.152  
∆NIR_EA 
  
  
-0.559  
  -1.468  
∆NL_DEP 
  
-0.158 ***   
-2.694    
EXCRCUM 
  
  -41.295 ** 
  -2.315   
McFadden R2 0.114  0.164   
Total Observations 77  140   
Nb of observations with Y=1 5  13   
χ
2
 stats for γl = 0 ∀ l   5.36**   
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant, the accounting 
indicators selected by a first stepwise process and the market indicators selected by a second stepwise process 
and a dummy variable (GRPB), which is equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group B (ie banks from Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines); and 0, otherwise (ie banks from Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and 
Singapore). This model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. 
Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. Sub-sample 1 includes Too Big To Fail banks that is banks for 
which DBIG=1, while sub-sample 2 includes relatively smaller banks (i.e., banks for which DBIG=0). DBIG is 
equal to 1, if: the Fitch Support rating is 1 or 2; a bank’s asset country rank is 1 or 2; or a bank’s asset size rank 
is 1 or 2 within the country sample if both FitchSupport rating and asset country ranks are not available. 
Variables definition: ∆NIR_EA = annual change of (Net Interest Revenue/ Total Earning Assets), ∆NL_DEP = 
annual change of (Net Loans/ Customer and Short Term Fundings), EXCRCUM = cumulative market excess 
return on the fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. 
 
 The results in table VIII show that one market indicator is significant to predict 
downgrades of small banks: EXCRCUM. Thus, for small banks, market information brings 
additional information, not already contained in accounting information. For large banks, no 
market indicator adds to the predictive power of the accounting indicator ∆NL_DEP. Thus, 
the results are still consistent with a Too Big To Fail effect. By contrast, accounting 
information is accurate for both small and large banks. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to determine whether equity market information can bring 
additional information, not already contained in accounting information, to predict Asian 
banks’ financial distress considering the possible existence of a Too Big To Fail effect. We 
                                                 
11
 We run two stepwise procedures: one with the accounting indicators and the other one adding market 
indicators. Here, we only report the results obtained at the end of the second procedure. 
12
 Due to missing data for the accounting variable selected, only 5 observations with Y=1 are included in the 
estimation on sub-sample 1. 
show that equity market indicators significantly contribute to the prediction model’s overall 
fit. These results are consistent with the findings of Krainer and Lopez (2004) and Curry, 
Elmer, and Fissel (2007) in the US case, and with those of Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi 
(2006) in the European case. However, our results also indicate that the conjecture of a Too 
Big To Fail effect cannot be rejected as market indicators are not significant to predict 
financial deteriorations of banks that can be perceived as Too Big To Fail. This result is 
opposite to those obtained in the European case by Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2006) and 
Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi (2006) who find that market indicators are significant to predict 
the financial distress of large banks. Thus, in the Asian case, market information is only 
useful for banks that are less likely to be bailed out in the event of default. 
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